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Abstract 
Using static and dynamic panel estimates in a sample including all 28 European Union countries 
during the last decade, this paper seeks to improve upon the existing literature with empirical 
evidence on the important role that well-functioning EU banking institutions can play in promoting 
economic growth. The banking sector performance is proxied by the evolution of some relevant 
financial ratios and economic growth is represented by the annual Gross Domestic Product growth 
rate. In order to analyse the possible differences arising after the outbreak of the recent 
international financial crisis, the estimations consider two panels: one for the time period 1998–
2012 and another for the subinterval 2007–2012. The results obtained allow us to draw conclusions 
not only on the importance of the variation of different operational, capital, liquidity and assets 
quality financial ratios to economic growth but also on some differences evidenced in the two 
considered panels, reflecting the consequences of the recent financial crisis and the correspondent 
reactions of the European banking institutions. 
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The relevance of the EU banking sector to economic growth and the recent financial crisis 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
During the last decade, and particularly after the outbreak of the recent international financial 
crisis, which deeply affected the European Union (EU) countries, concerns have mounted over the 
role of the financial institutions in dealing with the phenomena resulting from asymmetric 
information. It became more evident that the consequences of excessively risky credit supply can 
not only contribute to the possible collapse of some banking and other financial institutions, but 
also affect the process of financing the other economic sectors that contribute to economic growth. 
This paper seeks to improve upon the existing literature by testing the contribution of the EU 
banking institutions’ performance, proxied by some relevant financial ratios, to economic growth 
during the last decade and particularly after the recent financial crisis. Using static and dynamic 
panel estimation methods on a data set including all 28 current EU member states, we compare the 
results obtained for two panels: one considering the years between 1998 and 2012 and a second 
one for the subinterval spanning only from 2007 to 2012.  
The results obtained reveal not only the importance of the variation of different operational, 
capital, liquidity and assets quality financial ratios to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rate but also some differences evidenced in the two considered panels, reflecting the consequences 
of the recent financial crisis and the European banking institutions’ reactions to the crisis. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of some relevant 
literature; the used data and panel estimation methods are presented in Section 3; Section 4 reports 
the results obtained with the estimations; finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
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2. Review of some relevant literature 
The importance of the banking sector’s performance to economic growth has been the subject of 
intense theoretical debates and empirical studies, particularly after the publication of the renowned 
King and Levine papers (1993-a, 1993-b). 
There is a strand of literature pointing to a general consensus that well-functioning banking 
institutions and financial markets contribute to economic growth by decreasing transaction costs 
and the problems connected to asymmetric information. Furthermore, banking institutions are 
supposed to facilitate trade and the diversification of risk, and also to increase the financial 
resources to assist economic growth, by mobilizing savings, identifying the best investment 
opportunities and selecting the most profitable projects. 
Nevertheless, as already underlined by Khan and Senhadji (2000), while the general effects of 
financial development on the real outputs may be considered positive, the size of these effects 
varies not only with the different variables, namely with the chosen financial development 
indicators, but also with the estimation methods, data frequency or the defined functional forms of 
the relationships. 
Included in this strand of literature, Levine and Zervos (1998) consider data for 49 countries for 
the time interval 1976–1990 and conclude that there is a strong correlation between the rates of 
real per-capita output growth and stock market liquidity. At the same time, Demirguç-Kunt and 
Levine (1999), using data for 150 countries spanning the 1990s, demonstrate that wealthy 
countries have better developed financial systems, and define this development in terms of the size 
and efficiency of the financial sector, measured by the assets, liabilities, overhead costs and interest 
rate margins. Beck et al. (2004) consider the ratio between credits from financial intermediaries to 
the private sector divided by GDP as a proxy of financial intermediation in a panel of 52 countries 
during the period 1960 to 1999 and conclude that financial development is clearly pro-growth but 
also pro-poor. 
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More recently, Greenwood et al. (2010, 2013) empirically analysed the effects of financial 
development on economic growth, deploying a state cost verification model, and concluded that 
as financial sector efficiency rises, financial resources get redirected from the less productive firms 
to their more productive peers. This analytical approach was applied to both U.S. and cross-country 
data (more precisely, to a 45-country sample, first applied in Beck et al., 2000) and one of the key 
findings points to the conclusion that world output could increase by 53 per cent if all countries 
adopted the best global financial practices.  
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) consider a sample of developed and emerging economies and 
study how financial development contributes to aggregate productivity growth and conclude in 
favour of an inverted U-shaped financial development effect, meaning that this development exerts 
a positive influence on productivity growth but only up to a certain point and after that point the 
influence on growth turns negative. Moreover, these authors focus also on advanced economies, 
showing that a fast-growing financial sector can be detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. 
Other studies had already underlined that the contribution of the financial intermediaries to 
economic growth is far from consensual as the financial institutions can also be subject to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems that will constrain real economic growth through non-
adequate resource allocation, exaggerating the fluctuations in interest rates, or contributing to the 
decrease of the prevailing saving rates (among others, Bhide, 1993; Bencivenga et al., 1995; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Shan, 2005).  
Moreover, Gaytan and Rancière (2004) point out that, on the one hand, credit to the private sector 
and bank deposits contribute negatively to growth but, on the other hand, stock market size, 
liquidity and investment contribute positively to economic development. The same kind of 
conclusions were obtained by Ayadi et al. (2013) using a sample of northern and southern 
Mediterranean countries for the 1985–2009 time period: these authors confirm that there are 
deficiencies in bank credit allocation in the considered countries as credit to the private sector and 
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bank deposits are negatively associated with economic growth; however, on the stock market side, 
their results indicate that stock market size and liquidity do contribute to growth.  
There is also another strand of literature testing the causality relations between financial 
development and economic growth, including authors such as Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) 
and Greenwood and Bruce (1997), who believe that there may be a reverse causality between 
economic growth and financial development; others (like Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Shan 
et al., 2001; Calderon and Liu, 2003; Bangake and Eggoh, 2011; Kar et al., 2011; Abdelhafidh, 
2013) assume that there is a two-way causality relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. 
Hassan et al. (2011) analyse how financial development links to economic growth applying 
Granger causality tests for a sample period between 1980 and 2007, and categorizing low- and 
middle-income countries into six geographic regions: East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa; and also two groups of high-income countries: OECD and non-OECD 
countries. The conclusion to be drawn from their finding is that the evidence favours the 
contribution of financial development to economic growth, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries.  
Authors like Loayza and Rancière (2006) also underline the importance of the time horizon, 
agreeing that in the long term, the studies on economic growth find a positive relationship between 
financial development and real growth but, in the short term, the literature, and particularly that 
concerning bank crises, returns a negative relationship, revealing that monetary aggregates can 
represent good predictors of economic crisis. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that during 
banking crisis the credit provided to the private sector and the aggregate output decelerate (as 
empirically demonstrated, among others, by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999),  Laeven et al. (2002) 
and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008)). Recently, Laeven and Valencia (2013) confirmed the important 
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role of credit market frictions in the performance of the real economic activity during the recent 
crisis, using a sample including a large cross section of firms from 50 countries in both advanced 
and emerging market economies.  
To our knowledge, not many studies have empirically tested the relevance of the banking sector’s 
performance to economic growth in the context of all the European Union member states. 
In Ferreira (2008), quarterly data were used to analyse the possible influence of the financial 
systems on economic growth, in the context of the integration of new member states in the 
European Union.  The real per-capita GDP growth was explained by the following variables: the 
real growth of domestic credit, the foreign liabilities, the sum of the bonds and money market 
instruments, the bank assets/bank liabilities ratio, and the domestic credit/bank deposits ratio. Two 
balanced panels were considered with subsets of EU countries: one including 11 “old” EU member 
countries (excluding Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden) for the period between Q2 1980 
and Q4 1998, and another including 24 EU countries (excluding only Luxembourg) for the period 
between Q2 1999 and Q4 2002. The results obtained confirm the importance of the included 
financial variables to the real per-capita GDP growth and also the relatively more homogeneous 
behaviour in the panel considering only 11 of the “old” member states. 
Koetter and Wedow (2010) analysed the relevance of banking financial intermediation to 
economic growth but in 97 German economic planning regions for the time period between 1993 
and 2004 and concluded that the quality of these banks, defined by bank cost efficiency, robustly 
contributes to growth, while the quantity of bank credit provided does not clearly correlate with 
economic growth. The same kind of conclusions were  also obtained by Hasan et al. (2009), who 
studied whether regional growth in 11 European countries was influenced by bank costs and profit 
efficiency over the time period 1996–2005. Their findings indicate how, in these countries, an 
increase in bank efficiency generates five times more influence on economic growth than the same 
rise in the level of bank credit provided. 
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Recently, Ferreira (2015) also analysed the effects of the performance of the banking institutions 
on GDP growth using panel estimations and considering 27 EU countries for the time period 
between 1996 and 2008. Bank performance is represented not only by the traditional ROA and 
ROE ratios but also by bank efficiency, measured through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
taking into account the influence of bank market concentration represented by the percentage share 
of the total assets held by the three largest banking institutions (C3).  The main findings point to 
the expected and statistically significant positive influence of the ROA and ROE ratios and also of 
the DEA bank cost efficiency, and, although less strongly, to a negative effect of the C3 bank 
market concentration measure on EU economic growth.  
 
 
3. Data and estimation methodology  
3.1. Data  
In our estimations we use data sourced from the European Commission database, AMECO, more 
precisely the dependent variable, GDP and also the financial sector leverage, that is, the ratio of 
debt to equity. All the other financial ratios are sourced from the privately owned financial 
database maintained by the Bureau van Dijk, BankScope. 
Taking into account the classifications and definitions proposed by the BankScope database we 
consider the banking sector (more precisely, all commercial and savings banks) of each of the 28 
current EU member states and opt to use different kinds of financial ratios, more precisely: 
 Operational ratios:  
- Net Interest Margin, which is the interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-
bearing assets, representing the difference between what the bank receives from borrowers and 
what it pays to savers. So, the net interest margin focuses on the traditional borrowing and 
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lending operations of the bank. The increase of the margins is usually considered as desirable 
but only as long as the asset quality is being maintained. 
- Return on Average Assets, which is the ratio of the net income to the total assets of the banks 
and is useful in the assessment of the use of the banks’ resources and their financial strength. 
This ratio is often considered to be the most important single ratio in comparing the efficiency 
and operational performance of banks as it takes into account the returns generated from the 
assets financed by the bank. 
- Cost to Income, which is one of the most cited ratios as it measures the overheads or costs of 
operating the bank as the percentage of income generated before provisions. It is a useful 
measure of bank efficiency, although it can be distorted by high net income from associates or 
volatile trading income; moreover, if the lending margins in a particular country are 
comparatively very high then the cost-to-income ratio will improve as a result of this situation. 
  Capital ratios: 
- Equity to Total Assets, which is one of the most important capital ratios, representing the 
book value of equity divided by the total assets. Taking into account that equity represents a 
cushion against asset malfunction, the equity-to-total-assets ratio measures the amount of 
protection afforded to the bank by the equity invested in the bank;  the higher this ratio is, the 
more protected the bank is. Furthermore, this ratio measures the bank leverage levels and 
reflects the differences in risk preferences across banks. 
- Debt to Equity, which also measures the leverage levels and particularly the solvency of the 
bank, as this ratio represents the percentage of the bank’s equity that is owed by its creditors. 
It is a useful measure to evaluate the amount of risk that the bank creditors will be taking on 
by providing financial support to the bank. 
- Equity to Liabilities, which is another bank leverage ratio, representing the percentage of the 
bank’s liabilities covered by its equity or simply the bank’s capital adequacy. 
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  Liquidity ratios: 
- Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio, which is a liquidity measure and also a credit risk measure, 
obtained through the percentage of the assets of the bank that is tied up in loans; the lower this 
ratio is, the more liquid the bank will be. 
- Net Loans to Total Deposits and Borrowings, which is also a measure of bank liquidity, 
similar to the previous one, but its denominator includes the bank deposits and borrowings 
with the exception of capital instruments.  
  Assets quality ratio: 
- Impaired Loans to Gross Loans, which is a measure of the amount of the total loans that is 
doubtful, representing the quality of the bank assets; the lower this ratio is, the better the bank 
asset quality is. 
 
Different combinations of these ratios were included in the four estimated models in order to 
explain their influence on economic growth, here represented by the Gross Domestic Product, 
more precisely, the AMECO series “GDP total in national currency (including ‘euro fixed’ series 
for euro area countries), current prices – annual data”. 
We aim to analyse the bank performance contribution to the GDP growth (the natural logarithm 
of the GDP) of all the current EU member states as well as the possible differences after the 
outbreak of the recent financial crisis considering two panels of EU countries: one for the time 
period 1998–2012 and another for the shorter interval 2007–2012. 
Before proceeding with the panel estimations we test the stationarity of the series. We opted to use 
panel unit root tests, which not only increase the power of unit root testing due to the observation 
span but also minimize the risks of structural breaks. From among the available panel unit root 
tests, we chose here to use the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test.  
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The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or as an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, including lags and the null hypothesis stems from the existence of non-
stationarity. This test is adequate for heterogeneous panels of moderate size, such as the panels 
included in this paper. The results, considering the first differences of the chosen series, are 
reported in Appendix A and enable us to reject the existence of the null hypothesis.  
 
3.2. Estimation methodology 
The use of a panel data approach in our estimations not only guarantees more observations for 
estimations, but also reduces the possibility of multicollinearity among the different variables.  
Following, among others, Wooldridge (2010), we consider the general multiple linear panel 
regression model for the cross unit (in our case, the country’s i bank sector, defined as the sample 
of all commercial and saving banks) i = 1,…,N, which is observed for several time periods t 
=1,…,T: 
tiititi cxy ,,, '    
where: yi,t is the dependent variable (that is, each country’s i GDP growth rate at time t);  is the 
intercept;  xi,t is a K-dimensional row vector of explanatory variables (here, the presented bank 
sector financial ratios) excluding the constant;  is a K-dimensional column vector of parameters; 
ci is the individual country-specific effect; and ,t is an idiosyncratic error term. 
As we are dealing with balanced panels, we guarantee that each individual, i (here each country’s 
banking sector), is observed in all time periods, t. And one of the main advantages of using a panel 
data approach in this kind of cross-country regression is its ability to deal with the time-invariant 
individual effects (ci).  
In a panel random-effects model we believe that the individual specific effect is a random variable 
that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, while in a panel fixed-effects model we believe 
that this individual specific effect is a random variable that is allowed to be correlated with the 
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explanatory variables. In order to decide either to use fixed- or random-effects estimates it is 
possible to implement the Hausman (1978) procedure, which tests the null hypothesis that the 
conditional mean of the disturbance residuals is zero. The fixed-effects model will be preferred 
over the random-effects one if the null hypothesis is rejected; in contrast, the random-effects 
approach will be more appropriate than the fixed-effects method if the null hypothesis is accepted. 
However, neither fixed- nor random-effects models can deal with endogenous regressors, which 
may reveal an important concern in the context of the considered model. In order to deal with this 
limitation, we use dynamic panel estimates, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998), which can not only address the endogeneity problems (although only for weak 
endogeneity and not for full endogeneity, as explained by Bond (2002)) but also reduce the 
potential bias in the estimated coefficients. 
Here we chose the robust one-step and two-step system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) 
estimates. The system GMM method uses cross-country information and jointly estimates the 
equations in first difference and in levels, with first differences instrumented by lagged levels of 
the dependent and independent variables and levels instrumented by first differences of the 
regressors.  
In order to test the consistency of the GMM estimations, namely the validity of the additional 
instruments, we follow the tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). They are used to test 
autocorrelation, that is, the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated using the 
differenced error term, so, by construction, the autocorrelation of the first order, AR(1), is 
supposed to be validated but not the autocorrelation of the second order, AR(2), or autocorrelation 
of a higher order. Additionally, the validity of the instruments is tested through the Hansen J 
statistic, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation; under the null hypothesis of the 
validity of the instruments, the Hansen test has a chi-squared distribution with J-K degrees of 
freedom, where J is the number of instruments and K the number of regressors. 
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In order to avoid the problems connected to the proliferation of instruments in relatively small 
samples, like the one we are using here, Roodman (2009) says that in these kinds of estimations 
the number of instruments should not approach or exceed the number of cross units (in our case, 
the number of EU countries).  
 
 
4. Empirical results  
Using different combinations of the presented financial ratios as instruments, we estimate four 
models, considering for each of them two time periods: a longer one, between 1998 and 2012 
(Panel 1), and another one, for the interval spanning only from 2007 to 2013 (Panel 2), as we want 
to analyse the possible differences after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis.  Appendix B 
reports the correlation matrices of these models.  
We will analyse the results obtained for the considered four models with robust panel random-
effects estimates and also with robust dynamic panel-data one-step and two-step system GMM 
estimates. As the coefficients obtained with the used panel estimation methodologies are very 
stable across the different model specifications, we will comment on their economic meaning once 
for all.    
We opt to present the results obtained with panel robust random-effects estimates, assuming that 
the unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the observed ones, as these results are completely 
in line with those obtained with robust fixed-effects estimates and the Hausman test did not clearly 
validate the fixed-effects approach.  
Table 1 around here 
Table 1 reports the results obtained using robust panel random-effects estimates.  In all situations, 
and particularly for the time period after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis (our Panel 2), 
the obtained Wald test results and the comparatively high, for panel data estimates, R-squared 
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values allow us to conclude that our estimates are in general robust, meaning that the evolution 
(first differences) of the chosen financial ratios is statistically relevant to explain the GDP growth 
rate (first differences of natural logarithms). This relevance is also corroborated in Panel 1 (1998–
2012) as the results obtained for all financial ratios included in each of the four models are 
statistically very robust. 
In order to test the robustness of the results obtained with random-effects estimates we use robust 
dynamic panel-data system GMM estimates that reduce the potential bias in the estimated 
coefficients and control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. 
Here we begin by using the robust one-step estimates of the standard errors, which are consistent 
in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels, and we 
present the results obtained in Table 2. 
Table 2 around here 
 In both panels, and more clearly in Panel 1, the Wald tests results reveal the overall fit of the 
considered models. The Roodman (2009) rule of thumb is respected in all estimations as in the 
models of Panel 1 the number of instruments is 27 and in the models of Panel 2 the number of 
instruments is 9, thereby never exceeding the current number of the EU countries. 
The quality of these one-step estimates in Panel 1 is corroborated by the results obtained, in the 
four models, with the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests as they clearly reject the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation of the first order and do not reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the 
second order. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic does not reject the overidentifying restrictions, 
allowing us to believe that all included instruments are valid. 
With regard to the second panel, which includes only the years after the outbreak of the recent 
financial crisis (2007–2013), and still according to the results presented in Table 2, the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) tests in the four models clearly reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of 
the first order, and with the only exception of model 1 these tests do not reject the hypothesis of 
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no autocorrelation of the second order. At the same time, the Hansen J statistic validates all the 
internal and external instruments in models 1 and 4 but not so clearly in the other two models.  
In our estimations we also used the robust dynamic system GMM two-step estimates of the 
standard errors, which are considered asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimates. 
However, as demonstrated by Arellano and Bond (1991) and by Blundell and Bond (1998), in a 
finite sample the standard errors reported with two-step estimates tend to be severely downward 
biased. In order to compensate this bias, Windmeijer (2005) recommends a finite-sample 
correction to the two-step covariance matrix, which could make the two-step estimates more 
efficient than the one-step ones, but unfortunately, here, the limited number of current EU 
countries (our cross-section units) did not allow us to apply the Windmeijer correction.  
Nevertheless, the results obtained using robust dynamic two-step system GMM estimates, 
presented in Table 3, are completely in line with those obtained with the one-step estimates. In 
both panels and for the considered models, the Wald test results validate the estimations. As before, 
for Panel 1 (1998-–2012), in all models the Hansen test clearly does not reject the null that the 
instruments are valid and that they are not correlated with the errors, and, according to the results 
reported for the Arellano-Bond tests, the validity of the instruments is clearly supported as the 
residuals are always AR (1), but not AR (2).  
Table 3 around here 
Moreover, and still corroborating the results obtained with the one-step GMM estimates for Panel 
2 (2007–2012), the Hansen J statistic clearly validates only models 1 and 4; and with regard to the 
Arellano-Bond tests, Table 3 also shows that there is clear rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of the first order and almost always (model 1 is the only exception) the Arellano-
Bond tests validate the estimates and do not reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the 
second order.  
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The results obtained for the considered models with the used panel estimation methodologies are 
summarized in Table 4 and clearly show that, although not always with the same statistical 
robustness, the coefficients are always very stable across the different model specifications and 
estimation methodologies. 
Table 4 around here 
With regard to Panel 1, as expected, the evolution of the Return on Average Assets (included as 
an instrument in the four considered models) always goes in line with the GDP growth rate, 
revealing that the increase in efficiency and operational performance of the banking sector will 
contribute to the economic growth of the EU member states.  
Staying with the results reported in Table 4 for Panel 1, we can look at two other financial ratios 
that clearly go in line with the GDP growth rate, namely the Equity-to-Total-Assets ratio, 
indicating that more protected banks will be relevant to economic growth, and the Debt-to-Equity 
ratio, revealing that during this time period the bank sector leverage levels and the correspondent 
risks may have increased but they did not contradict economic growth.  The Equity-to-Liabilities 
ratio, which is another bank leverage ratio, as well as the Net-Loans-to-Total-Assets and Net-
Loans-to-Total-Deposits-and-Borrowings ratios also grow in line with GDP. 
Not surprisingly, the evolution of the Impaired-Loans-to-Gross-Loans ratio, representing the 
dubious provided bank loans, is negatively related to the GDP growth rate; and the same occurs 
with the Cost-to-Income ratio as the increase of the banking operational costs may be synonymous 
with less efficiency in providing the necessary bank financing of productive investments that will 
contribute to economic growth. 
However, in this case (Panel 1), a relative surprise may be the negative influence on the GDP 
growth of the Net Interest Margins, defined as the interest income minus interest expense divided 
by interest-bearing assets, or simply the difference between what the bank receives from borrowers 
and what it pays to savers, representing the traditional borrowing and lending bank operations. But 
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a more attentive look at the evolution of the bank Net Interest Margins reveals that during the 
considered time period they were in many cases decreasing, so it is not a real surprise to find that 
their evolution was not in line with economic growth. 
Most of these tendencies were kept after the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, as evidenced 
by the results still reported in Table 4 but for the years between 2007 and 2012 (Panel 2). 
Nevertheless, there are also some differences, due to the reactions of European banking to the 
financial crisis. More precisely, during this shorter time period the evolution of the Equity-to-
Liabilities and Equity-to-Total-Assets ratios was opposite to the GDP growth rate, as a symptom 
of the decrease of the bank sector leverage levels after the outbreak of the crisis. At the same time, 
and revealing the tendency to the increase of the traditional bank activities that was another 
response to the crisis, in Panel 2 the evolution of Net Interest Margins is now in line with the 
economic growth. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
Using static and dynamic panel estimates in a sample of all 28 EU member states during the last 
decade this paper provides empirical evidence of the important role that well-functioning banking 
institutions can play in promoting economic growth, here represented by the annual GDP growth 
rate. The data were sourced from the AMECO database and mostly from the Bankscope database 
as the performance of the banking institutions was proxied by some relevant financial ratios, 
including operational, capital, liquidity and assets quality ratios. In order to analyse the possible 
differences arising after the outbreak of the recent international financial crisis, the estimations 
considered two panels: one for the time period 1998–2012 and another for the subinterval 2007-–
2012. 
Summarizing, the results obtained allow us to conclude that: 
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1. With regard to the included operational ratios:  
 For the first panel (1998–2012) there is clear and statistically strong evidence that the 
variation (mostly the decrease) of the Net Interest Margins, representing the traditional 
borrowing and lending operations, contrasts he GDP growth rate; but after the outbreak of 
the crisis (2007–2012) this variation is in line with economic growth, confirming that after 
the crisis many banking institutions decided to give emphasis to the traditional banking 
activities. 
 In both panels there is clear evidence that the variation of the Return on Average Assets 
of the EU banking institutions contributes positively to economic growth. 
 And although not with the same statistical strength, there is still evidence that before and 
after the crisis, the increase of the Cost-to-Income ratio, a proxy for less bank efficiency, 
does not contribute to the GDP growth rate.  
 
2. With regard to the capital ratios: 
 The contribution to economic growth of the Equity-to-Total-Assets ratio, one of the 
measures of the banking leverage levels and the correspondent risk preferences, also 
reveals the differences in the behaviour before and after the outbreak of the international 
crisis. In our first panel (1998–2012) this ratio increases in line with the GDP, but for the 
subinterval 2007-2012 it looks like it is opposite to the economic growth as a symptom of 
the decrease of the banking leverage levels.     
 There is clear evidence that in both panels, the increase of the bank solvency, here 
represented by the evolution of the Debt-to-Equity ratio, contributes positively to the GDP 
growth rate. 
 However, with regard to the Equity-to-Liabilities ratio, which is another measure of the 
bank leverage level, it is in line with the economic growth in our first panel (1998–2012) 
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but it is in contrast to the GDP growth in the subinterval 2007–2012, confirming the 
tendency to increase the bank protection after the outbreak of the crisis.   
   
3. As for the liquidity ratios: 
 There is clear evidence that in both panels more liquid banks, here represented by the Net-
Loans-to-Total-Assets ratio, contribute positively to the GDP growth rate. 
  The same results were obtained when bank liquidity was proxied by the Net-Loans-to-
Total-Deposits-and-Borrowings ratio.  
 
4. Finally, for the assets-quality ratio:  
 As expected, the increase of the Impaired-Loans-to-Gross-Loans ratio, representing the 
fall of the quality of the bank assets, clearly contradicts the GDP growth rate, before and 
after the recent international financial crisis. 
These results lead us to conclude that, although banking institutions were generally considered 
responsible for the recent financial crisis, their wealthy performance could also be a relevant 
contribution to economic growth, at least in the universe of all 28 EU member states during the 
last decade.   
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APPENDIX A – PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST  
  
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
Variables Coefficient t-star P > t obs. 
GDP  -0.45558 -5.56807 0.0000 351 
Net Interest Margin -1.08930 -19.31776 0.0000 351 
Return on Average Assets  -1.11523 -23.67703 0.0000 351 
Cost to Income  Ratio  -1.43582 -28.31398 0.0000 351 
Equity to Total Assets Ratio  -1.27586 -22.14069 0.0000 351 
Debt to Equity Ratio  -1.13918 -15.61671 0.0000 351 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio  -1.46836 -28.22642 0.0000 351 
Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio -1.00437 -14.98206 0.0000 351 
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Net Loans to Total Deposits  
and Borrowings Ratio  
 
-1.05457 
 
-16.26953 
 
0.0000 
 
351 
Impaired Loans to  
Gross Loans  Ratio  
 
-0.98484 
 
-16.44459 
 
0.0000 
 
351 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007ü2012) 
Variables Coefficient t-star P > t obs. 
GDP  -1.14952 -21.08455 0.0000 108 
Net Interest Margin -1.29413 -10.66102 0.0000 108 
Return on Average Assets  -1.31640 -8.78615 0.0000 108 
Cost to Income  Ratio  -1.45812 -46.31647 0.0000 108 
Equity to Total Assets Ratio  -1.18626 -12.72064 0.0000 108 
Debt to Equity Ratio  -1.48950 -14.40565 0.0000 108 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio  -0.59464 -5.28540 0.0000 108 
Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio -1.30110 -18.89312 0.0000 108 
Net Loans to Total Deposits  
and Borrowings Ratio  
 
-1.37850 
 
-21.48547 
 
0.0000 
 
108 
Impaired Loans to  
Gross Loans  Ratio  
 
-1.28129 
 
-12.44569 
 
0.0000 
 
108 
 
 
APPENDIX B – CORRELATION MATRICES  
 
MODEL I 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
  
GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average  
Assets 
Cost to  
Income  
Ratio 
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
-0.2095 
 
1.0000 
 
 
    
Return on Avera
Assets 
 
0.1700 
 
0.0089 
 
1.0000 
 
 
   
Cost to Income  
Ratio 
 
-0.0346 
 
-0.1465 
 
0.1387 
 
1.0000 
 
 
  
Equity to 
Total Assets  
Ratio 
 
-0.0007 
 
 
0.2166 
 
 
0.0170 
 
 
-0.0116 
 
1.0000 
  
Net Loans to 
Total Assets  
Ratio 
 
0.1657 
 
0.1370 
 
-0.0026 
 
 
-0.0348 
 
-0.1958 
 
1.0000 
 
Impaired Loans 
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
-0.2238 
 
 
-0.0997 
 
 
-0.1080 
 
 
-0.0246 
 
 
0.0150 
 
 
-0.0357 
 
 
1.0000 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012)  
  
GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average  
Assets 
Cost to  
Income  
Ratio 
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
0.3889   
 
1.0000 
 
 
    
Return on  
Average Assets 
 
0.2357   
 
0.0936    
 
1.0000 
 
 
   
Cost to Income  
Ratio 
 
-0.0630   
 
-0.1802    
 
0.2992 
 
1.0000 
 
 
  
Equity to Total 
Assets Ratio 
 
0.0647   
 
0.0803   
 
0.6027    
 
0.3199 
 
1.0000 
  
Net Loans to 
Total Assets  
Ratio 
 
0.2638 
 
 
0.2413 
 
-0.1153 
 
-0.0022 
 
-0.0897 
 
 
1.0000 
 
Impaired Loans 
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
-0.5928 
 
 
-0.4376 
 
 
-0.4146 
 
 
0.0199 
 
-0.2201 
 
-0.1809 
 
1.0000 
 
Model II 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
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GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average Assets
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Equity to 
Liabilities 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
-0.2095 
 
1.0000 
 
 
    
Return on 
Average Assets 
 
0.1700 
 
0.0089 
 
1.0000 
 
 
   
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
0.0591 
 
0.0328 
 
-0.3586 
 
1.0000 
   
Equity to 
Liabilities 
Ratio  
 
0.0085 
 
0.2030 
 
-0.0684 
 
0.0010 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
 
 
0.1296 
 
 
0.1689 
 
 
0.0554 
 
 
0.0058 
 
 
-0.1800 
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
-0.2238 
 
 
-0.0997 
 
 
-0.1080 
 
0.0047 
 
0.0028 
 
-0.0315 
 
1.0000 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012)  
  
GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average Assets
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Equity to 
Liabilities 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
0.3889 
 
1.0000 
 
 
    
Return on 
Average Assets 
 
0.2357 
 
0.0936 
 
1.0000 
 
 
   
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
0.2350 
 
0.1293 
 
-0.4488 
 
1.0000 
   
Equity to 
Liabilities 
Ratio  
 
0.0664 
 
0.0834 
 
0.6011 
 
-0.3418 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
 
 
0.2530 
 
 
0.2548 
 
 
0.0495 
 
 
-0.0193 
 
 
0.1969 
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
-0.5928 
 
 
-0.4376 
 
 
-0.4146 
 
-0.0807 
 
 
-0.2132 
 
-0.2481 
 
1.0000 
 
Model III 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
  
GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average  
Assets 
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
-0.2095 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
 
   
Return on 
Average Assets 
 
0.1700 
 
0.0089 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
 
  
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
 
-0.0007 
 
 
0.2166 
 
0.0170 
 
 
1.0000 
   
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
0.0591 
 
0.0328 
 
-0.3586 
 
-0.0435 
 
1.0000 
  
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
 
 
0.1296 
 
 
 
0.1689 
 
 
 
0.0554 
 
 
 
-0.1281 
 
 
 
0.0058 
 
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
-0.2238 
 
-0.0997 
 
-0.1080 
 
 
0.0150 
 
 
0.0047 
 
 
-0.0315 
 
 
1.0000 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012)  
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GDP 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Return on 
Average  
Assets 
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
GDP 1.0000       
Net Interest 
Margin 
 
0.3889      
 
1.0000  
 
 
 
 
   
Return on 
Average Assets 
 
0.2357      
 
0.0936      
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
 
  
Equity to 
Total Assets 
Ratio 
 
0.0647   
 
 
0.0803    
 
0.6027   
 
1.0000 
   
Debt to Equity 
Ratio 
 
0.2350    
 
0.1293    ‐0.4488 
 
‐0.3182 
 
1.0000 
  
Net Loans to 
Total Deposits 
and Borrowing
Ratio 
 
 
0.2530    
    
 
 
0.2548    
   
 
 
0.0495   
   
 
 
0.1947  
    
 
 
‐0.0193   
 
 
1.0000 
 
 
 
Impaired Loan
to Gross Loans 
Ratio 
 
‐0.5928   
    
 
‐0.4376   
 
‐0.4146    
 
‐0.2201    
 
‐0.0807   
 
‐0.2481    
 
1.0000 
 
Model IV 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
 GDP Return on Average  
Assets 
Debt to Equity  
Ratio 
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio
GDP 1.0000    
Return on Average Assets 0.1700 1.0000   
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.0591 -0.3586 1.0000  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio 
 
-0.2238 
 
-0.1080 
 
0.0047 
 
1.0000 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012) 
 GDP Return on Average  
Assets  
Debt to Equity  
Ratio 
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio
GDP 1.0000    
Return on Average Assets 0.2357 1.0000   
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.2350 -0.4488 1.0000  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio 
 
-0.5928 
 
-0.4146 
 
-0.0807 
 
1.0000 
 
 
TABLE 1 – RESULTS OBTAINED WITH ROBUST PANEL RANDOM-EFFECTS ESTIMATES 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Constant:     
Coefficient .0522928     .052782       .0528509        .0570513        
Z 11.89    11.30    11.24    8.73    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Net Interest Margin     
Coefficient -.020414    -.0197993    -.0194422        
Z - 2.73    -2.58    -2.52     
P>|z| 0.006 0.010 0.012  
Return on Average Assets     
Coefficient .0077313    .009462     .0090373        .0088976        
Z 1.92    2.41    2.33    2.07    
P>|z| 0.054 0.016 0.020 0.038 
Cost to Income Ratio      
Coefficient -.0001108           
Z -2.59       
P>|z| 0.010    
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Coefficient .0011713     .0009857         
Z 2.94     2.11     
P>|z| 0.003  0.035  
Debt to Equity  Ratio     
Coefficient  .0000462           .0000465    .0000479        
Z  2.86 2.80    2.62    
P>|z|  0.004 0.005 0.009      
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Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Coefficient  .0001745      
Z  3.25      
P>|z|  0.001   
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
    
Coefficient .0025459       
Z 3.15       
P>|z| 0.002    
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
    
Coefficient  .0017024         .0016124        
Z  2.82    2.79     
P>|z|  0.005 0.005  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans  
Ratio  
    
Coefficient -.0033026    .     -.0032209       -.0032458       -.0032348       
Z -2.08    -2.17    -2.18    -1.93    
P>|z| 0.038 0.030     0.029 0.053 
     
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 
R-squared: overall               0.1816 0.1779 0.1734 0.0856 
Wald chi2(6)= 18.77  
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0046) 
chi2(6)= 21.01 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0018) 
chi2(6)= 15.41 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0173) 
chi2(3)= 12.32 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0064) 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant: .0363955       .035119       .0353325      .035386    
Coefficient 6.99    6.24    6.26       6.67    
Z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P>|z|     
Net Interest Margin .0248209        .0271866       .027126      
Coefficient 1.84    1.98    1.98     
Z 0.066 0.048 0.048  
P>|z|     
Return on Average Assets  .0033513       .0073346       .0078133        .0038298     
Coefficient 0.81    1.76    1.85    0.79    
Z 0.416 0.078 0.064 0.429 
P>|z|     
Cost to Income Ratio  -.0000155          
Coefficient -0.58       
Z 0.562    
P>|z|     
Equity to Total Assets Ratio  -.0045794      -.0073134        
Coefficient -1.57     -3.64     
Z 0.116  0.000  
P>|z|     
Debt to Equity  Ratio  .000049        .00005     .0000505      
Coefficient  2.24    2.38    2.10    
Z  0.025 0.017 0.036 
P>|z|     
Equity to Liabilities Ratio   -.0051919        
Coefficient  -2.99      
Z  0.003   
P>|z|     
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
 
.0023714       
   
Coefficient 1.57       
Z 0.117    
P>|z|     
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
  
.0017666     
 
.001808       
 
Coefficient  1.33    1.35     
Z  0.185 0.178  
P>|z|     
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio  
 
-.0101189      
 
-.0092901       
 
-.0092821      
 
-.0113432       
Coefficient -4.67       -4.03    -3.95    -4.80    
Z 0.000 0.000      0.000 0.000 
     
25 
 
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 
R-squared:  overall                 0.3983 0.4316 0.4338 0.3973 
Wald chi2(6)= 85.82 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000) 
chi2(6)= 106.59 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000) 
chi2(6)= 110.40  
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000) 
chi2(3)= 50.44 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000) 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – RESULTS OBTAINED WITH GMM ONE-STEP SYSTEM ROBUST ESTIMATES  
 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant:     
Coefficient .0493973    .0512404       .0505405      .0594523     
Z 8.23    8.73    9.19    9.38    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000      0.000 
Net Interest Margin     
Coefficient -.0482579    -.0459546       -.0451795      
Z - 4.14    -4.80    -4.36     
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Return on Average Assets     
Coefficient .0141178      .0203632       .0184421      .0306129      
Z 1.14    1.62       1.30    2.54    
P>|z| 0.254 0.106 0.194 0.011 
Cost to Income Ratio      
Coefficient -.0005741          
Z -1.31       
P>|z| 0.191    
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Coefficient .0074547        .0057554       
Z 0.87     0.69     
P>|z| 0.384      0.492  
Debt to Equity  Ratio     
Coefficient  .0000712        .0000765     .000102     
Z  1.16    1.18    1.68    
P>|z|  0.247     0.236 0.093 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Coefficient  .0013863        
Z  0.94      
P>|z|  0.349   
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
    
Coefficient .0074346          
Z 2.42       
P>|z| 0.016    
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
    
Coefficient  .0048514       .0053426       
Z  1.88    2.14     
P>|z|  0.060 0.033  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans  
Ratio  
    
Coefficient -.0200331         -.018912      -.0190542     -.0112152       
Z -3.69    -3.57    -3.15    -2.86     
Variables 0.000 0.000    0.002 0.004 
     
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 
Wald chi2(6)=345.70          
  (Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)=231.67           
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)= 214.29  
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(3)=129.61            
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
z =  -2.45   
Pr > z =  0.014 
z =  -2.15 
Pr > z =  0.031 
z =  -3.03   
Pr > z =  0.002 
z =  -2.61   
Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
z =  -1.10   
Pr > z =  0.273 
z =  -0.56   
Pr > z =  0.574 
z =  -0.88   
Pr > z =  0.378 
z =  -1.36   
Pr > z =  0.173 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions 
chi2(20)     =  25.85   
Prob > chi2  =  0.171 
chi2(20)     =  21.85 
Prob > chi2  =  0.349 
chi2(20)     =  19.76   
Prob > chi2  =  0.473 
chi2(23)     =  25.94   
Prob > chi2  =  0.304 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012) 
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Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant:     
Coefficient .0395615        .0363696        .036474    .0336779       
Z 5.58    3.58    3.53    3.74    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000      0.000 0.000 
Net Interest Margin     
Coefficient .0000378    -.0124893    -.0130854      
Z 0.00       -0.26    -0.27     
P>|z| 0.999 0.797 0.787  
Return on Average Assets      
Coefficient .0237022     .0276092      .0273611      .0272035      
Z 1.82    2.24    2.25    2.92    
P>|z| 0.069 0.025 0.025 0.004 
Cost to Income Ratio      
Coefficient -.0011964       
Z -1.25       
P>|z| 0.212    
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Coefficient -.002932     -.0065448    
Z -0.19     -0.55     
P>|z| 0.848  0.583  
Debt to Equity  Ratio     
Coefficient  .0001444      .0001455     .0001847      
Z  1.51    1.52    2.31    
P>|z|  0.130 0.128     0.021 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Coefficient  -.0055897        
Z  -0.57      
P>|z|  0.572   
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
    
Coefficient .0092586            
Z 1.30       
P>|z| 0.194          
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
    
Coefficient  .0036515        .0035677        
Z  0.47    0.46     
P>|z|  0.636 0.649      
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans  
Ratio  
    
Coefficient -.0104036          -.0102903      -.0104932      -.009355       
Z -1.62 -1.62    -1.65    -1.64    
Variables 0.105 0.106 0.098 0.102 
     
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 
Number of instruments 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2(6) =60.20           
 (Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6) = 160.54 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6) =164.25           
 (Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(3) = 143.36  
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
z =  -2.33   
Pr > z =  0.020 
z =  -2.37   
Pr > z =  0.018 
z =  -2.47   
Pr > z =  0.013 
z =  -2.31   
Pr > z =  0.021 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
z =  -2.56   
Pr > z =  0.010 
z =  0.12   
Pr > z =  0.906 
z =  0.05   
Pr > z =  0.962 
z =  -0.42 
Pr > z =  0.671 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions 
chi2(2)     =  2.18   
Prob > chi2  =  0.336 
chi2(2)     =  6.11   
Prob > chi2  =  0.047 
chi2(2)     =  6.09 
Prob > chi2  =  0.048 
chi2(5)     =  6.28   
Prob > chi2  =  0.280 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 – RESULTS OBTAINED WITH GMM TWO-STEP SYSTEM ROBUST ESTIMATES 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant:     
Coefficient .0495289     .0488487        .0472125      .058415        
Z 8.59    7.48    6.76    8.99    
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
Net Interest Margin     
Coefficient -.0470439       -.0463135        -.047058       
Z -3.94    -4.81    -4.33     
P>|z| 0.000 0.000      0.000  
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Return on Average Assets      
Coefficient . .0139477        .0228858       . .0220348       .0318669      
Z 1.14    1.96    1.28    2.55    
P>|z| 0.253    0.050 0.200    0.011 
Cost to Income Ratio      
Coefficient -.0005776          
Z -1.29       
P>|z| 0.196          
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Coefficient . .0071458         .0038635     
Z 0.92     0.62     
P>|z| 0.357        0.537  
Debt to Equity  Ratio     
Coefficient  .0000712      .0000733      .000106      
Z  1.30    1.25    1.83    
P>|z|  0.193 0.212 0.068 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Coefficient  .0008071         
Z  0.58      
P>|z|  0.562   
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
    
Coefficient .0073507          
Z 2.74       
P>|z| 0.006    
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
 .   
Coefficient  .0052782 .0060862      
Z  1.65    2.13     
P>|z|  0.100 0.033  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans Ratio  
    
Coefficient -.0199294    -.0183571      -.0185143      -.0110235       
Z -3.47    -4.26    -3.51    -2.89    
Variables 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 
     
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 
Wald chi2(6)=252.49            
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)=193.45           
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)= 181.07 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(3)= 125.04  
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
z =  -2.37   
Pr > z =  0.018 
z =  -2.81   
Pr > z =  0.005 
z =  -2.60   
Pr > z =  0.009 
z =  -2.39   
Pr > z =  0.017 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
z =  -1.00 
Pr > z =  0.315 
z =  -0.69   
Pr > z =  0.491 
z =  -0.70   
Pr > z =  0.487 
z =  -1.11   
Pr > z =  0.266 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions 
chi2(20)     =  25.85   
Prob > chi2  =  0.171 
chi2(20)     =  21.85 
Prob > chi2  =  0.349 
chi2(20)     =  19.76   
Prob > chi2  =  0.473 
chi2(23)     =  25.94   
Prob > chi2  =  0.304 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
Constant:     
Coefficient .0364753      .0289431       .0291311       .0249584      
Z 4.70    2.67    2.64    3.53    
P>|z| 0.000 0.007    0.008 0.000 
Net Interest Margin     
Coefficient .0393553       -.0220063     -.0241139       
Z 0.94    -0.27    -0.30     
P>|z| 0.349 0.790 0.767  
Return on Average Assets      
Coefficient .0274706        .0371236       .036514       .0304691          
Z 2.36    1.60    1.61    2.53 
P>|z| 0.018 0.110 0.108 0.012 
Cost to Income Ratio      
Coefficient -.0005632         
Z -1.14       
P>|z| 0.254    
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Coefficient -.0079079       -.0114652       
Z -0.56     -0.97     
P>|z| 0.577  0.334  
Debt to Equity  Ratio     
Coefficient  .0001754         .0001749         .0002182       
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Z  0.97 0.95    2.43    
P>|z|  0.333 0.342 0.015 
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Coefficient  -.0097436         
Z  -1.01      
P>|z|  0.312   
Net Loans  to 
Total Assets Ratio 
    
Coefficient .0048658          
Z 0.83       
P>|z| 0.408    
Net Loans to Total Deposits 
and Borrowings Ratio  
    
Coefficient  .0019728       .0020911       
Z  0.11    0.11     
P>|z|  0.913 0.909  
Impaired Loans  
to Gross Loans  
Ratio  
    
Coefficient -.0064817     -.0069015     -.0073162       -.0066715       
Z -1.12    -0.94    -1.02    -1.07    
Variables 0.261 0.346 0.306 0.283 
     
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 
Number of instruments 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2(6)=43.70           (Prob.
chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)= 58.39 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(6)=59.90            
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
chi2(3)= 88.19 
(Prob. > chi2 = 0.000) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
z =  -1.52   
Pr > z =  0.129 
z =  -1.66   
Pr > z =  0.098 
z =  -1.62   
Pr > z =  0.105 
z =  -2.00   
Pr > z =  0.046 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
z =  -2.05   
Pr > z =  0.041 
z =  -0.05 
Pr > z =  0.963 
z =  -0.13     
Pr > z =  0.898 
z =  -0.77   
Pr > z =  0.444 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions 
chi2(2)     =  2.18   
Prob > chi2  =  0.336 
chi2(2)     =  6.11   
Prob > chi2  =  0.047 
chi2(2)     =  6.09 
Prob > chi2  =  0.048 
chi2(5)     =  6.28   
Prob > chi2  =  0.280 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 – SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OBTAINED WITH PANEL ROBUST ESTIMATES 
PANEL 1 – (1998–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant:     
Random fixed effects + ***     + ***        + ***      + ***        
GMM one-step system + ***     + ***        + ***      + ***        
GMM two-step system + ***     + ***        + ***      + ***        
Net Interest Margin     
Random fixed effects - ***     - ***     - ***      
GMM one-step system - ***  - *** - ***  
GMM two-step system - ***  - *** - ***  
Return on Average Assets      
Random fixed effects + **        + ** . + **         + **     
GMM one-step system +    +   +  + ***        
GMM two-step system +    + **        +    + ***        
Cost to Income Ratio      
Random fixed effects - ***            
GMM one-step system -       
GMM two-step system -          
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Random fixed effects + ***      + ***      
GMM one-step system +   +     
GMM two-step system +        +  
Debt to Equity Ratio      
Random fixed effects  + ***          + ***          + ***          
GMM one-step system  +    +    + *         
GMM two-step system  +    +    + *         
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Random fixed effects  + ***                
GMM one-step system  +      
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GMM two-step system  +   
Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio     
Random fixed effects + ***    
GMM one-step system + **         
GMM two-step system + ***           
Net Loans to Total Deposits  
and Borrowings Ratio  
    
Random fixed effects  + ***     + ***          
GMM one-step system  + *   + **  
GMM two-step system  + + **  
Impaired Loans to  
Gross Loans Ratio  
    
Random fixed effects -  **     -  **          - **         -  **           
GMM one-step system - ***  - *** - *** - ***
GMM two-step system - ***  - *** - *** - ***
     
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 
 
 
PANEL 2 – (2007–2012) 
Variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3  MODEL 4
Constant:     
Random fixed effects + ***     + ***        + ***      + ***        
GMM one-step system + ***     + ***        + ***      + ***        
GMM two-step system + ***     + **        + **      + ***        
Net Interest Margin     
Random fixed effects + *       + **     + **       
GMM one-step system + -    -     
GMM two-step system + - -  
Return on Average Assets      
Random fixed effects +  + * + * + 
GMM one-step system + *  + ** + ** + ***
GMM two-step system + **  + * + * + **
Cost to Income Ratio      
Random fixed effects -         
GMM one-step system -       
GMM two-step system -    
Equity to Total Assets Ratio      
Random fixed effects -      - ***       
GMM one-step system -     -     
GMM two-step system -  -  
Debt to Equity Ratio      
Random fixed effects  + ** + ** + **
GMM one-step system  + + + **
GMM two-step system  + + + **
Equity to Liabilities Ratio      
Random fixed effects  - ***   
GMM one-step system  -   
GMM two-step system  -   
Net Loans to Total Assets Ratio     
Random fixed effects +          
GMM one-step system +       
GMM two-step system +    
Net Loans to Total Deposits and 
Borrowings Ratio  
    
Random fixed effects  +       +        
GMM one-step system  +    +     
GMM two-step system  + +  
Impaired Loans to  
Gross Loans Ratio  
    
Random fixed effects - ***     - *** - *** - ***
GMM one-step system -  - - * -
GMM two-step system -  - - -
     
Number of observations 140 140 140 140 
 
+ Positive effect; - negative effect; * Statistically significant at 10%; ** statistically significant at 5%; *** statistically significant 
at 1%.  
Source: Estimation results reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  
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